Assistant Professor (RTDb) of Economics
at the University of Padova
CEPR Research Affiliate (MG and POLECON Research Groups)
http://citec.repec.org/p/r/pru160.html
You may download my CV and contact me at:
Department of Economics and Management "Marco Fanno"
via del Santo 33
35100 Padova (Italy)
Phone: +39-3515436907
email: alessia.russo@unipd.it
Research Interests: Political Economy, Public Finance, Macroeconomics.
Research Project: GENESIS - Generationally Sustainable Institutions (financed by STARS-Unipd 2022-2024)
Working Papers
• Optimal Sustainable Intergenerational Insurance (joint with Francesco Lancia and Tim Worrall) [pdf] revision requested by the Journal of Political Economy
CEPR Working Paper DP15440 [link] [WE_ARE Seminar Series]
ABSTRACT: How should successive generations insure each other when the enforcement of transfers between generations is limited? This paper studies intergenerational insurance when transfers maximize the expected discounted utility of all generations subject to a participation constraint for each generation. If complete insurance is not achievable, the optimal intergenerational insurance is history-dependent even when the environment is stationary. The risk from a generational shock is spread into the future, with periodic resetting. Interpreting intergenerational insurance in terms of public debt, the fiscal reaction function is non-linear and the risk premium on debt is lower than the risk premium with complete insurance.
• Public Debt and Growth in a Democracy with Partisan Politics (joint with Sergio Cappellini and Francesco Lancia) [pdf]
ABSTRACT: We study the strategic relationship between public productive investments and pork barrel spending, along with public debt, in the presence of partisan conflicts. Using a probabilistic voting framework without future policy commitments, we find that partisan conflicts lead to divergent policy platforms and prevent the economy from converging to an immiseration regime. In the Markov-perfect politico-economic equilibrium, the party biased towards more public investments displays less discipline than the party favoring pork barrel spending. Higher growth generated by public investments increases the endogenous debt limit, leading to more indebtedness and reduced public spending in the long run. Our findings help explain the coexistence of rising debt and political cycles observed in democratic countries.
• On the Effectiveness of Gendering Politics (joint with Arcangelo Dimico and Francesco Lancia) [pdf]
ABSTRACT: We examine the effectiveness of gender reforms in increasing women's representation in elected offices. We exploit variations generated at the Italian regional and municipal elections by two forms of gender reforms: i) party-list gender quotas, a supply-side reform intended to influence party decisions regarding candidacy, and ii) double-gender preference systems, a demand-side reform intended to influence voting decisions on candidates. Our findings indicate that party-list gender quotas have no effect on the likelihood of women winning a seat, whereas double-gender preference systems are effective in increasing women's representation. Furthermore, we provide evidence that supply-side reforms are more susceptible to party-list manipulations, which undermine their effectiveness. In constituencies with a stronger voter gender bias, supply-side reforms may also unintentionally have a negative impact on women's representation in leadership positions.
• Political Violence in Electoral Procurement Cycles (joint with Arcangelo Dimico and Francesco Lancia) [pdf] In Progress
at the University of Padova
CEPR Research Affiliate (MG and POLECON Research Groups)
http://citec.repec.org/p/r/pru160.html
You may download my CV and contact me at:
Department of Economics and Management "Marco Fanno"
via del Santo 33
35100 Padova (Italy)
Phone: +39-3515436907
email: alessia.russo@unipd.it
Research Interests: Political Economy, Public Finance, Macroeconomics.
Research Project: GENESIS - Generationally Sustainable Institutions (financed by STARS-Unipd 2022-2024)
Working Papers
• Optimal Sustainable Intergenerational Insurance (joint with Francesco Lancia and Tim Worrall) [pdf] revision requested by the Journal of Political Economy
CEPR Working Paper DP15440 [link] [WE_ARE Seminar Series]
ABSTRACT: How should successive generations insure each other when the enforcement of transfers between generations is limited? This paper studies intergenerational insurance when transfers maximize the expected discounted utility of all generations subject to a participation constraint for each generation. If complete insurance is not achievable, the optimal intergenerational insurance is history-dependent even when the environment is stationary. The risk from a generational shock is spread into the future, with periodic resetting. Interpreting intergenerational insurance in terms of public debt, the fiscal reaction function is non-linear and the risk premium on debt is lower than the risk premium with complete insurance.
• Public Debt and Growth in a Democracy with Partisan Politics (joint with Sergio Cappellini and Francesco Lancia) [pdf]
ABSTRACT: We study the strategic relationship between public productive investments and pork barrel spending, along with public debt, in the presence of partisan conflicts. Using a probabilistic voting framework without future policy commitments, we find that partisan conflicts lead to divergent policy platforms and prevent the economy from converging to an immiseration regime. In the Markov-perfect politico-economic equilibrium, the party biased towards more public investments displays less discipline than the party favoring pork barrel spending. Higher growth generated by public investments increases the endogenous debt limit, leading to more indebtedness and reduced public spending in the long run. Our findings help explain the coexistence of rising debt and political cycles observed in democratic countries.
• On the Effectiveness of Gendering Politics (joint with Arcangelo Dimico and Francesco Lancia) [pdf]
ABSTRACT: We examine the effectiveness of gender reforms in increasing women's representation in elected offices. We exploit variations generated at the Italian regional and municipal elections by two forms of gender reforms: i) party-list gender quotas, a supply-side reform intended to influence party decisions regarding candidacy, and ii) double-gender preference systems, a demand-side reform intended to influence voting decisions on candidates. Our findings indicate that party-list gender quotas have no effect on the likelihood of women winning a seat, whereas double-gender preference systems are effective in increasing women's representation. Furthermore, we provide evidence that supply-side reforms are more susceptible to party-list manipulations, which undermine their effectiveness. In constituencies with a stronger voter gender bias, supply-side reforms may also unintentionally have a negative impact on women's representation in leadership positions.
• Political Violence in Electoral Procurement Cycles (joint with Arcangelo Dimico and Francesco Lancia) [pdf] In Progress
